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THE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL TREATMENT 
UNDER THE GATT AND THE GATS: DE FACTO 
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Abstract
Both the GATT and the GATS provisions have the same points of view on defining discrimination as 
an unequal treatment given to foreign providers compared to treatment given to domestic providers. 
Discrimination under the national treatment of the GATT and the GATS is considered as a practice 
that prevents foreign providers from enjoying all comfortable facilities that are given to domestic 
providers. Non-discriminatory application in both provisions might also be interpreted in the market 
access issue. Moreover, it is not considered as discrimination of national treatment of both provisions if 
it concerns on laws, regulations, or requirement regulating the procurement by government agencies. 
Both provisions use likeness and treatment no less favourable test in order to determine whether or 
not there is a discrimination against foreign products or services or services suppliers. There are 
several distinctions of discriminations between the principle of national treatment under the GATT 
and the GATS. The discrimination under the principle of national treatment of the GATT has general 
application to all trade in goods. On the other hand, the discrimination under national treatment 
obligation for trade in services under the GATS only applies if commitments have been scheduled. It 
can be concluded that the discrimination of national treatment under the GATT and the GATS seems 
to be de facto discrimination because both provisions do not provide the sufficient measures in order 
to find a violation. It results from; the GATS national treatment is derived from traditional concepts of 
the GATT that the application of the national treatment of the GATT is adduced by the GATS.
Keywords: discrimination, national treatment, GATT and GATS
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the main principles of non-discrimination in World Trade 
Law (WTO), the principle of national treatment prohibits a member 
from discriminating against other members1. The key provision of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 describing dis-
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Universitas Syiah Kuala (2004); Master of European Legal Studies (LL.M.), The Uni-
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1  P.Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2nd edn 
Cambridge University Press, New York 2008) p.396 
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crimination of the principle of national treatment obligation is Article 
III, and the key provision of the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices (GATS) dealing with discrimination in trade in services against 
other countries or the national treatment obligation is Article XVII2 .
One of the main impediments to trade in goods and trade in serv-
ices is derogation from national treatment3. According to Bossche, the 
relevant part concerning the GATT provisions on national treatment are 
regulated in Article III4 entitled ‘National Treatment on Internal Taxa-
tion and Regulation’, which are stated in paragraphs 1, 2, and 45, and 
the principle of national treatment under the GATS is worded in Arti-
cle XVII, paragraphs 1, 2, and 36, which entitled ‘National Treatment’. 
2  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.396
3  T. Warren and C. Findlay, ‘ Measuring Impediments to Trade in services’ in P. Sauve 
and R.M.Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Direction in Services Trade Liberalization, 
(Brooking Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2000) p.59
4  Article III of the GATT 1994 (1) The [Members] recognize that internal taxes and 
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and 
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products 
in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so to afford protection to domestic production. (2) The products of the terri-
tory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any other [Member] shall not be 
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
[Member] shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or 
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph. (3)… 
(4) The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of any 
other [Member] shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use.   
5  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.344
6  Article XVII of the GATS (1) In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject 
to any conditions and any qualifications set out therein, each member shall accord 
to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures 
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
its own like services and service suppliers (2) A member may meet the requirement 
of paragraph 1 by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, 
either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to 
its own like services and service suppliers. (3) Formally identical or formally differ-
ent treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of 
competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like 
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Warren and Findlay define national treatment in Article XVII: 1 of the 
GATS “as treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like do-
mestic services and service providers, subject to the limitations and con-
ditions set out in the country’s schedule of commitments”7. According 
to the definition, it is clear that discrimination under national treatment 
of the GATS is an unequal treatment between domestic and Foreign 
Service suppliers, hence, an official decision to limit foreign investment 
is considered as a breach of national treatment8. Pursuant to Article III, 
paragraph 1 of the GATT, national treatment is considered as the treat-
ment provided to foreign goods that must be as good as that provided to 
national or domestic goods9. Bossche clearly states that “the principal 
purpose of the principle of national treatment of Article III of the GATT 
1994 is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and 
regulatory measures”10. Similarly, the Appellate Body explains that the 
broad and principal purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in 
the application of internal tax and regulatory measures11. The purpose 
is resulted from Article III: 1, which aims at ensuring that there, should 
not impose internal measures on imported and domestic products in 
order to afford protection to domestic production12. In other words, it is 
compulsory for Members of the WTO to provide equality of competi-
tive conditions for imported goods in relation to domestic goods.13
It can be seen that there is a distinction between Article III of GATT 
and Article XVII of GATS in terms of national treatment. Li states that 
Article XVII of GATS does not differentiate between border and inter-
nal restriction; it covers all measures, which might be differentiating 
foreign services or service suppliers.14 The wording of “all measures 
affecting the supply of services” shows prima facie a wide coverage 
services or service suppliers of any other Member.  
7  T. Warren and C. Findlay, Op.cit p.59
8  Ibid. p. 60
9  S. Lester and others (eds), World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 
Publishing, Portland 2008) p.280
10  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.396
11   S. Lester and others, (eds) Op.cit. p.280
12  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.396 
13  Ibid. p.396 
14  Guojun Li, National ‘National Treatment Under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services” (2010) 6 Cambridge Student L. Rev. 74, p. 77
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of national treatment application that could embrace the six types of 
marker access restrictions if they are imposed discriminatorily.15  
This paper aims to compare and contrast the discrimination under 
the principle of National Treatment under the GATT with the GATS in 
order to clarify if there is any difference, and whether the discrimina-
tion is de facto or de jure. Section two deals with the comparison and 
contrast between the discrimination of national treatment obligation un-
der the GATT and the GATS. Section three concludes.   
II.THE COMPARISON AND CONTRAST BETWEEN THE DIS-
CRIMINATION OF NATIONAL TREATMENT OBLIGATION 
UNDER THE GATT AND THE GATS. 
Wang states that Article III: 1 of GATT is a general national treat-
ment regulation of trade in goods aiming at preventing any contract-
ing party from protecting domestic products by imposing different in-
ternal taxes, other internal charges, laws, regulations and other related 
requirements.16 In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body de-
cided that Article III:1 expresses a general principle that informs the 
remains of Article III .17 Pursuant to Article XVII paragraphs 2 and 3, 
it can be interpreted ‘treatment no less favourable’ and there is the fact 
that Article XVII: 1 is a reflection of Article III of the GATT.18     
Both provisions of the GATT and the GATS concerning discrimina-
tion of non-domestic products and services or services suppliers under 
both national treatment have the same purpose of preventing a Mem-
ber of the WTO from conducting such practice. Therefore, there is no 
less favourable treatment for imported products or services or service 
suppliers. Nevertheless, it seems that the GATS is still possible not to 
remove barriers of trade in services by either discriminating regulatory 
requirement imposed only on foreign services or by restrictive regula-
15  Ibid. p.77
16  Wei Wang, ‘National Treatment in Financial Services in the Context of the GATS/
WTO’ (2003-2004) Stud. Int’l Fin. Econ. &  Tech. L. 149. p.151
17  Ibid. p. 151
18   Ibid. p.161
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tions applied to both domestic and foreign services19. Similarly, national 
treatment under the GATT also provides an opportunity for a Member to 
prevent any other Member from taking advantage of its national treat-
ment obligation by setting out the regulation restricting the domestic 
products from enjoying low internal taxes. Consequently, suppliers of 
imported products have no reason for complaining such regulation in or-
der to get lower internal taxes. Based on the resemblance of the purpose 
of the national treatment obligation between the GATT and the GATS, it 
seems that the concepts and terminology in the GATS are adopted from 
the traditional definition of the GATT, hence, this application is confus-
ing because the concepts and terminology are used in ways that are not 
similar to their application in GATT, or it does not make the intent of the 
commitments in the services context much more clearer20 .  
Thus, it can be inferred that the definition of national treatment un-
der the GATT and the GATS seems to be similar regarding the non-
discriminatory application of domestic regulations to foreign products 
or services or service suppliers. According to Feketekuty, such applica-
tion has caused that quantitative limits placed on foreign services or 
service suppliers might fall under both the market access and national 
treatment provisions21. Such overlapping regulation could confuse a 
Member of the WTO in scheduling commitments due to the fact that 
national commitments concerning the discriminatory application of 
quantitative regulatory controls could fall under either the schedules as 
market access or as national treatment commitments22. Lester believes 
that “Article XVII has been the subject of some limited interpretation in 
the case law”23. By exemplifying there are a lot of views in terms of in-
terpreting the meaning of non discrimination in Article III of the GATT, 
Lester states that it would result in the interpretation and application of 
Article XVII of the GATS might not always be clear and consistent24 . 
To avoid such problem, Article XX: 2 on the scheduling commitments 
19  G. Feketekuty, ‘ Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS’ in P. Sauve 
and R.M.Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Direction in Services Trade Liberalization, 
(Brooking Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2000) p.95
20  Ibid. p.95
21  Ibid. p.95
22  Ibid. p.95 
23  S. Lester and others (eds) Op.cit. p.629
24   Ibid. p.629
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provide that “measure inconsistent with both Articles XVI [on market 
access] and Article XVII [on national treatment] shall be inscribed in 
the column relating to Article XVI”25. Albeit it could overcome poten-
tial confusion relating to the scheduling of discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions, it caused a discrepancy between the text of the provisions 
on market access and national treatment on the one side and the market 
access content and national treatment columns in the national sched-
ules on the other26. The distinction between the articles and schedules 
has resulted in wrong assumption of some countries that national com-
mitments would only have effects when a commitment on market ac-
cess has been made27. The mixture of commitments on discriminatory 
and non-discriminatory barriers has the further impact of combining 
two ideas, but different purposes of trade liberalization and domestic 
regulating reform28. To remove discrimination regulation, whether in 
quantitative or qualitative form, is all connected to trade liberalization, 
while removing non-discriminatory constraint on services is frequently 
considered as a practice of domestic regulatory reform29. The applica-
tion of non-discriminatory quantitative constrains more often than not 
reflects a country’s approach to the regulation of service sector activ-
ity30. Such overlapping commitments increases a barrier for countries 
those are willing to tackle the barriers of trade liberalization or the re-
form of domestic law in a service sector, but both do not happen at 
the same time31. It is clear that the influence of traditional definition of 
market access and national treatment of the GATT on GATS structure 
and terminology has caused a significant confusion among peoples in-
volved in trading activities who do not really understand the details of 
the agreement32. As a result, they consider that market access in services 
is similar to tariff binding in GATT, and national treatment under the 
GATS is equal to national treatment under the GATT33 .     
25  G. Feketekuty Op.cit. p.95 
26  Ibid.p.95
27  Ibid. p.95 
28  Ibid. p.95 
29  Ibid. p.95 
30  Ibid. p.95 
31  Ibid. p.95 
32  Ibid. p.95 
33  Ibid. p.95 
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   Bossche also mentions other paragraphs of Article III of the GATT 
in relation to specific measures such as paragraphs 5-7 regarding inter-
nal quantitative regulations concerning the mixture, processing or use 
of products in specific amount; paragraph 8(a) regarding government 
procurement; paragraph 8(b) governing subsidies to domestic produc-
ers; paragraph 9 regulating internal maximum price control measures; 
and paragraph 10 dealing with internal quantitative regulation concern-
ing cinematographic films34.  In accordance with paragraph 5, local con-
tent requirements are not allowed, and paragraph 8(a) states that the 
national treatment obligation is not allowed intervening to laws, regula-
tions or requirements ruling government procurement35 . 
In terms of exemption of government procurement from the GATT’s 
intervention as mentioned in Article III: 8 (a) above, Article XIII of the 
GATS clearly declares that the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) as word-
ed in Article II: 1, national treatment as mentioned in Article XVII, and 
market access articles should not apply to laws, regulations or require-
ments regulating the procurement by government agencies in terms of 
purchasing services only for governmental purposes and not with the 
purpose of business or with the view to use in the supply of services for 
commercial sale36. Due to the fact that the principle of national treat-
ment under the GATT and the GATS are not allowed to deal with laws, 
regulations or requirements regulating the government procurement as 
discussed above, it could be deduced that regarding such government 
procurement’s issue, the principle of national treatment obligation un-
der the GATT is similar to the national treatment obligation of under 
the GATS. Both provisions have prevented Members of the WTO from 
interfering laws, regulations or requirements governing government 
procurement of other Members.       
Article III of the GATT obliges Members to treat imported products 
equal to like domestic products when the imported products have en-
tered the domestic market37. The objectives of Article III could be found 
in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages as ‘avoiding protectionism, requiring 
34  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.344
35  Ibid. p.344 
36  C. Arup, The World Trade Organization Knowledge Agreements (2nd edn Cam-
bridge University Press, New York 2008) p.193  
37  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.344
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equality of competitive conditions and protecting expectations of equal 
competitive relationship’38. In addition, Panels and scholars state that 
one of the main goals of Article III is to assure that domestic measures 
of WTO Members do not undermine their commitments concerning tar-
iffs under Article II39. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body stressed that 
the purpose of Article III is wider; it can be seen in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II40, the Appellate Body stated:
“The broad purpose of Article III of avoiding protectionism must 
be remembered when considering the relationship between Article III 
and other provisions of the WTO Agreement. Although protection of 
negotiated tariff concessions is certainly one purpose of Article III, the 
statement in Paragraph 6.13 of the Panel Report that ‘one of the main 
purposes of Article III is to guarantee that WTO Members will not un-
dermine through internal measures their commitments under Article II’ 
should not be overemphasised. The sheltering scope of Article III is not 
limited to products that are subject of tariff concessions under Article 
II. The Article III national treatment obligation is a general prohibition 
on the use of internal taxes and other internal regulatory measures so 
as to afford protection to domestic production. This obligation clearly 
extends also to products not bound under Article II. This is confirmed 
by the negotiating history of Article III”41 . 
Therefore, it could be concluded that “the national treatment of Ar-
ticle III of the GATT is an obligation of general application that 
applies both to product with regard to which Members have made 
tariff concessions and to products with regard to which Members 
have not done so”42.
On the other hand, the GATS provisions on national treatment pro-
vided in Article XVII of the GATS are not similar to the national treat-
ment obligation of Article III of the GATT 199443 . In accordance with 
Article XVII: 1 of the GATS, national treatment only could be imposed 
38  Appelate Body Report, Korea-Alcoholic Beverages, para.120.  
39  Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 613 
40  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.346
41  Appellate Body Report, Japan- Alcoholic Beverages II, 16 
42  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.346
43  Ibid. p.391
The Discrimination under the Principle of National Treatment under the GATT and the GATS
545Volume 11 Number 4 July 2014
if commitments have been scheduled44. It results from this provision 
is worded differently from the obligation of Article III of the GATT45 . 
Consequently, Article XVII of the GATS seems to arrange some juris-
prudence of Article III of the GATT through its explicit wording that 
both formally identical and formally unequal treatment is included, and 
its reference to modification of the condition of competition46. As Boss-
che mentioned above, the national treatment obligation set out in Ar-
ticle III of the GATT 1994 has general application to all trade in goods47, 
however, Article XVII of the GATS regulating the national treatment 
obligation for trade in services does not have such general application 
because it does not concern generally to all measures influencing trade 
in services48. Similarly, Kariyawasam states that “the obligation for na-
tional treatment under the GATT is a general one as opposed to one 
that depends on the level of specific commitments undertaken and in-
scribed in Members’ Schedules under the GATS”49 . It is clear that the 
national treatment obligation under Article XVII of the GATS has an ef-
fect only if WTO Members have explicitly agreed on granting national 
treatment regarding specific sectors50. The commitments are regulated 
by Members of the WTO in the national treatment column of their Spe-
cific Commitment Schedules51. Trebilcock and Howse believe that the 
schedules of specific commitments are considered as the essential mat-
ter and substance of the GATS52. Such specific commitments used to 
grant national treatments are often arranged amount to certain circum-
stances, qualifications and limitations that are also ruled in the sched-
ules53. According to Bossche, there are several typical national treat-
ment restrictions embodied in Schedules connected to “nationality or 
residence requirements for executives of companies supplying services, 
44  S. Lester and others (eds) Op.cit., p. 628 
45  Ibid. p. 628
46  Ibid. p. 629
47  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.391 
48  Ibid. p.391
49  R. Kariyawasam, International Economic Law and the Digital Divide: A New Silk 
Road? (Edward Elgar, Massachusetts 2007) p. 128 
50  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.391
51  Ibid. p.391
52  M.J. Trebilcock and R.Howse, TheRegulation of International Trade (3rd edn 
Routledge, Oxon 2005) p.358
53  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.391 
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requirement to invest a certain amount of assets in local currency, re-
striction on the purchase of land by foreign suppliers, special subsidy or 
tax privileges granted only to domestic suppliers and differential capital 
requirements and special operational limits applying only to operations 
of foreign suppliers”54. Article XVII of the GATS includes the principle 
of National Treatment because of which a Member must agree with 
services and service suppliers of any other Member concerning all mea-
sures affecting the service supplies, treatment no less favourable than 
which it accords to its own like services or service suppliers55. Such 
commitments are produced by WTO Members in the national treatment 
column of their Schedule of Specific Commitments, and these commit-
ments are often required to certain circumstances, qualification and lim-
itations, that are also arranged in the schedules56. Kariyawasam states 
that the principle of national treatment under the GATS is an essential 
point because a Member might be able to restrict its national treatment 
to protect domestic industries or to achieve domestic policy objective57 . 
In addition, Warren and Findlay discriminate between national 
treatment under the GATT and the GATS based on categories of im-
pediments58. They explain that national treatment obligation under the 
GATS does not describe a distinction between frontier and internal 
restrictions but embraces all policies that might discriminate between 
domestic and foreign providers; hence, Article XVII of the GATS en-
compasses both national treatment and market access59. On the other 
hand, national treatment obligation under the GATT extends to matters 
of internal taxation and regulation only60 .  
Moreover, Lester believes that one significant difference between 
the GATT and the GATS regarding the national treatment principle is 
the distinction in modes of delivery between the GATT and the GATS61 . 
There is only one mode of delivery, which is called cross border regu-
54  Ibid. p.391
55  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.128
56  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.391
57  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.128
58  T. Warren and C. Findlay, Op.cit. p. 59  
59  Ibid. p. 59
60  Ibid. p. 59 
61  S. Lester and others (eds), Op.cit. p. 629 
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lated in the principle of national treatment under the GATT.62 However, 
there are four modes of delivery under the GATS, namely: cross-border 
supply (Mode 163), consumption abroad (Mode 264), commercial pres-
ence (Mode 365), and presence of natural persons (Mode 466)67 . These 
modes are set out in Article I: 2 of the GATS. Lester defines the modes 
as following: Mode 1 is defined as the mode that “is most analogous 
to trade in goods, in that a service (like an exported goods) crosses a 
national frontier”68. Mode 2 is defined as the mode that “involves the 
movement of consumers to the territory of supplier”69; Mode 3 is de-
fined as “the mode of supply effectively means foreign investment, 
which can take various forms”70, and Mode 3 is define as the mode that 
“involves services provided through the movement of citizens of one 
country to another country”71 .       
Kariyawasam states that in terms of the GATT only concerns on 
cross-border trade in goods, the GATS also regulates cross-border trade 
besides governing three other modes of supply: consumption abroad, 
commercial presence (Mode 3), and movement of natural persons72 . 
Therefore, it can be inferred that there is a similarity between the prin-
ciple of national treatment under the GATT and the GATS in terms of 
both provisions regulate cross-border supply (Mode 1). Karsenty ex-
62  Ibid. p. 629
63  The supply of service from the territory of one Member into the territory of any 
other Member: GATS Article I: 2 (a) 
64  The supply of service in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any 
other Member: ibid, Art I: 2 (b)
65  The supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member through commercial 
presence in the territory of any other Member: ibid, Article I:2(c). The term ‘commer-
cial presence’ is defined at Article XXVIII (d) GATS: Commercial presence means 
any type of business or professional establishment, including through (i) the constitu-
tion, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or (ii) the creation or mainte-
nance of a branch or representative office, within the territory of a Member for the 
purpose of supplying a service.  
66  The supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of 
natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member: ibid, Article I:2(d)
67  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.135
68  S. Lester and others (eds), Op.cit. p. 601
69  Ibid. p. 601
70  Ibid. p. 601 
71  Ibid. p. 601
72  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.128
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plains that cross-border supply (Mode 1) regulated in the national treat-
ment obligation of the GATS is similar to the traditional notion of trade 
in goods as regulated in the national treatment obligation of the GATT, 
in which situation both the consumer and the supplier of product remain 
in their respective territories when the product is delivered73. Concern-
ing trade in services, such situation might happen if the service could be 
kept in a transportable medium, such as a paper document or on diskette 
of computer, or could be digitized and delivered by means of telecom-
munication links74 . 
In contrast, national treatment under the GATS not only regulates 
cross-border trade in goods (Mode 1), but also covers the rest modes 
of supply; consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 
3) and presence of natural persons (Mode 4). National treatment com-
mitments under the GATS are negotiated levels of commitment that 
a member might qualify or restrict in some circumstance of specific 
categories of service or modes of supply75. It results from a national 
treatment obligation under the GATS only arises if a service has been 
scheduled76. It is possible for Members to grant national treatment in a 
specific service sector only concerning certain modes of supply, for ex-
ample cross border supply, and not others such as, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence, or presence of natural persons77. Therefore, it 
makes possible for a Member to limit it national treatment in order to 
give protection for domestic services or service suppliers. Nevertheless, 
Lester states that due to the fact that there are four modes of supply 
provided by national treatment under the GATS, it would raise ques-
tion how the GATS national treatment obligation should apply to for-
eign services or services suppliers using not similar modes78. It must be 
remembered that national treatment commitments are made for each 
individual mode79. It would be difficult to reach an agreement between 
73  G. Karsenty, ‘Assessing Trade in Services by Mode of Supply’ in P. Sauve and 
R.M.Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Direction in Services Trade Liberalization, 
(Brooking Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2000) p.35
74  Ibid. p.35-36
75  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.128
76  Ibid. p.128 
77  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.391
78  S. Lester and others, (eds) Op.cit. p. 629
79  Ibid. p. 629
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Members if each Member offers different modes of supply, and it would 
happen that the only national treatment commitment possibly applied 
between Members is mode one of supply regulating cross-border sup-
ply80. Therefore, the desire for reciprocity at a negotiating level would 
play an important role in shaping specific commitments arranged under 
the auspices of GATS, as it has in other areas of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations81. Regarding such problem, Lester suggests that “examina-
tion of a claim of violation of the national treatment provisions would 
require a comparison of the foreign service or service supplier at issue 
with the various competing domestic services and service suppliers, to 
determine whether they are ‘like’82. Kariyawasam exemplifies that “in 
terms of restricting content delivered by way of electronic intangibles, 
a GATS classification would obviously offers greater flexibility than a 
GATT classification”83. The United States that is known as the states 
strong on exporting of electronic intangibles could recognise national 
treatment under the GATS as a great opportunity for member to make 
restriction on their national treatment obligations by enacting new 
domestic regulation that could be possible to limit the United States 
imports based on content limitation such as restriction on television 
broadcasting or electronic books or other content rich products84 . Re-
garding such national treatment application, Kariyawasam refers to its 
application in Europe, where terrestrial television content is limited by 
applying the Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWFD), Directive 
89/552/EEC (as amended)85 .      
As discussed earlier that the main purpose of national treatment 
obligations of Article III of the GATT is to secure prevention of pro-
tectionism in terms of applying internal tax and regulatory measures. 
In addition, the objective of national treatment regulated in the Article 
III of the GATT is to secure equality competitive conditions between 
imported products and domestic products. Therefore, it requires the test 
of consistency of internal taxation whether or not it is relevant to the 
80  Ibid. p. 629
81  T. Warren and C. Findlay,Op.cit. p. 61 
82  S. Lester and others (eds), Op.cit p. 629
83  R. Kariyawasam, Op.cit. p.128
84  Ibid. p.128 
85  Ibid. p.128
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national treatment obligation of Article III: 286 . In order to determine 
such consistency, first sentence of the GATT obliges the necessary of 
examination of “whether the measure at issue is an internal tax, whether 
the imported and domestic products are like products and whether the 
imported products are not taxed in excess of the domestic products”87 .
Moreover, the second sentence of the Article III: 2 of the GATT 
also still focuses on national treatment regarding internal taxation, but 
it considers a wider category of product than mentioned in the first sen-
tence, and it rules directly competitive or substitutable products88 . Test 
of consistency provided in the second sentence is different from the 
previous sentence, it requires the examination of whether the measure 
in the scope of internal tax, whether between the imported and domestic 
products are directly competitive or substitutable, whether these prod-
ucts are taxed unequally, and whether the purpose of unequal taxation 
is to give protection to domestic products89 . 
Furthermore, national treatment obligation under the GATT also con-
cerns on internal regulation as regulated in Article III: 4. In determining 
whether or not a measure is relevant to the national treatment obliga-
tions of Article III: 4 of the GATT, there are three types of examination, 
namely: whether the measure at issue is a law, regulation or requirement 
falls under Article III: 4 of the GATT, and whether there is an agreement 
regarding treatment no less favourable of imported products90 .
The national treatment obligation under the GATS also obliges a 
Member that has made a specific commitment in order to reward na-
tional treatment to fulfil the national treatment obligation of Article 
XVII of the GATS, hence, in order to determine whether a measure is in 
accordance with the national treatment obligation of Article XVII of the 
GATS, there is a three-tier test requiring the examination of “whether 
the measure at issue is a measure covered by the GATS, i.e. a measure 
by a Member affecting trade in services; whether the foreign and do-
mestic services or service suppliers are ‘like services’ or ‘like service 
86  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.397
87  Ibid. p.397 
88  Ibid. p.397 
89  Ibid. p.397 
90  Ibid. p.397
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suppliers’; and whether the foreign services or service suppliers are 
granted ‘treatment no less favourable’”91 . 
In regard with such like service or like service suppliers, Article 
XVII does not suggest that the mode of supply is a consideration in 
defining “likeness” of service, the structure of schedules provides that 
a member’s commitments are mode-specific.92 There is the fact that in 
commitment on market access Article XVI of the GATS, the dramatic 
discrimination between modes is permitted, members may let the sup-
ply of a service through one mode and not through another.93 Even, Arti-
cle XVII does not refer to the modes of supply, Members’ commitment 
to provide national treatment have been specified mode by mode. For 
example, a member may have offered to provide national treatment un-
der modes 1 and 2 but not 3 and 4; hence this agreement of scheduling 
commitments would seem to indicate that members may legitimately 
keep the right to discriminate between the same service supplied by 
different modes .94   
Concerning treatment no less favourable, Arup states that the na-
tional treatment of the GATS requires that foreign services and service 
suppliers be accorded no less favourable treatment than is accorded 
to local counterparts.95 Article XVII: 2 of the GATS suggests that “a 
member may meet this requirement by according to foreign services 
and services suppliers either formally identical or formally different 
treatment to that which it accords to its own like services or service 
suppliers”.96 Article XVII: 3 of the GATS provides that such treatment 
could be considered as less favourable if it modifies the conditions or 
competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the member 
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other member. 
Trebilcock and Howse pose that Due to the fact that Article XVII of the 
GATS contains a national treatment obligation regarding sectors listed 
in a Member’s schedule, formally different treatment of foreign pro-
91  Ibid. p.398 
92  Aaditya Mattoo, ‘National Treatment in the GATS, Corner-Stone or Pandora’s Box’ 
(1997) 31 J. World Trade 107. p.119 
93  Ibid. p.119
94  Ibid. p.119
95  C. Arup (n.31) p.189
96  Ibid. p.189
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viders might be consistent with national treatment obligation because 
based on the commitment such formally different treatment would be 
no less favourable97. Trebilcock and Howse consider that such national 
treatment application is very much a double-edged sword concerning 
formally identical treatment, and it might be considered to infringe the 
national treatment obligation if it modifies the competition conditions 
in favour of domestic service providers98. Such approach to national 
treatment might circumvent a prohibition on intentionally discrimina-
tory measures; it reflects the view that equal treatment implies adapta-
tion of domestic regulations so that foreign providers have substantive-
ly equal competitive opportunities99. It is resulted from Article XVIII 
of the GATS that states explicitly that Members might negotiate and 
bind within their schedules additional commitments although it is not 
consistent with Article XVII100. WTO Secretariat also allows Members 
to lodge reservations with respect to national treatment by stating that 
“a Member may wish to maintain measures which are inconsistent 
with both Articles XVI and XVII. Article XX: 2 stipulate that such 
measures shall be inscribed in the column relating to Article XVI 
on market access. Thus, while there may be no limitation entered 
in the national treatment column, there may exist a discriminatory 
measure inconsistent with national treatment inscribed in the mar-
ket access column. However, in accordance with Article XX: 2, any 
discriminatory measure scheduled in the market access column is 
also to be regarded as scheduled under Article XVII and subject to 
the provision of that Article. When measures inconsistent with both 
articles XVI and XVII are inscribed in the column relating to Article 
XVI (as provided for in Article XX: 2), Members could indicate that 
this is the case (e.g. by stating ‘also limits national treatment’ in the 
market access column)”101.      
On the other hand, due to the fact that there is no specific agreement 
in the GATT national treatment, hence, there is no circumvention such 
provided in the GATS national treatment. Nevertheless, a measure dis-
97  M.J. Trebilcock and R.Howse (n.47) p. 366
98  Ibid. p. 366
99  Ibid. p. 366 
100  Ibid. p. 366 
101  Ibid. p. 366 
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criminating between ‘like products’ does not suffice to claim that this 
measure is irrelevant to Article III: 4 of the GATT regulating treatment 
no less favourable102. As the appellate Body noted in EC-Asbestos: 
There is a second element that must be established before a mea-
sure can be held to be inconsistent with Article III: 4…A complaining 
Member must still establish that the measure accords to the group of 
‘like’ imported products ‘less favourable treatment’ than it accords to 
the group of ‘like’ domestic products103 .
From the examinations used above in determining whether internal 
taxation is relevant to the national treatment obligation ruled in Article 
III: 2 of the GATT, and whether a measure made in a specific commit-
ment is in accordance with national treatment regulated in Article XVII 
of the GATS, it can be seen that both provisions include likeness and 
treatment no less favourable tests in the examination in order to deter-
mine whether the conducts have been consistent with the both national 
treatment provisions. Therefore, national treatment obligations under 
the GATT and the GATT have the same way in determining whether 
there is a violation of national treatment obligation of both provisions 
or not . 
It can be seen that there is a similarity between the national treatment 
obligation under the GATT and the GATS in terms of regulating prod-
ucts, services or service suppliers which are like104. Articles III: 2, first 
sentence and III: 4 of the GATT and Article XVII: 1 of the GATS only 
apply to like products, services or service suppliers105. The Appellate 
Body pointed that “the concept of ‘like products’ is like an accordion 
whose width varies depending on the provision under which the term 
is interpreted, but the determination of whether products are ‘like prod-
ucts’  is, in essence, a determination of the nature and extent of the com-
petitive relationship between these products”106. In determining whether 
or not imported goods are being discriminated against domestic goods, 
it requires that there must be the treatment of a similar domestic goods 
102  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.398 
103  Apellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, para 100  
104  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.398 
105  Ibid. p.398
106  Ibid. p.398 
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of which could serve as the basis for comparison107 . Whether there are 
‘like’ between imported and domestic goods as worded in Article III: 
2, first sentence of the GATT, it results from being imposed a tax by 
government or other charge that varies among goods that are part of 
closely connected group, for example alcoholic beverages108 . The same 
approach can be said in determining whether or not services or service 
suppliers are ‘like’109. Unlike in the case of products, there is no the 
physical qualities in the case of services could be compared in order to 
ascertain whether these services are like services or not110. As a result, 
the distinction of the services is not easy to be identified111. Therefore, 
it requires for comparison of the treatment of like services. There are 
several indicators in determining ‘likeness’ are “the characteristics of 
the products, services and service suppliers, the classification of the 
products, services and service suppliers, consumer tastes and habits 
regarding the products, services and service suppliers and for product 
their end-use”112 .
III.CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the discrimination of national treatment under the 
GATT and the GATS seems to be de facto discrimination because both 
provisions do not provide the sufficient measures in order to find a vi-
olation. It results from the GATS national treatment is derived from 
traditional concepts of the GATT that the application of the national 
treatment of the GATT is adduced by the GATS  
There are several similarities between national treatment of the 
GATT and the GATS concerning discrimination between foreign and 
domestic products or services. Discrimination under the national treat-
ment of the GATT and the GATS is considered as a practice that pre-
vents foreign providers from enjoying all comfortable facilities that are 
given to domestic providers. Non-discriminatory application in both 
107  S. Lester and others (eds), Op.cit. p. 280
108  Ibid. p. 280 
109  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.398 
110  S. Lester and others (eds), Op.cit. p. 191 
111  Ibid. p. 192 
112  P.Van den Bossche, Op.cit. p.398 
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provisions might also be interpreted in the market access issue. More-
over, it is not considered as discrimination of national treatment of both 
provisions if it concerns on laws, regulations, or requirement regulating 
the procurement by government agencies. Both provisions use likeness 
and treatment no less favourable test in order to determine whether or 
not there is a discrimination against foreign products or services or ser-
vices suppliers.
There are distinctions between both provisions in terms of dis-
criminating against foreign products. The discrimination under national 
treatment of the GATT is an obligation of general application that ap-
plies both to product with regard to which member have made tariff 
concession and have not been made. However, under the GATS the 
discrimination only exists if commitments have been scheduled. More-
over, under the GATT, discrimination extends to matters at internal tax-
ation and regulation only. But under the GATS this is not clear between 
frontier and internal restrictions, the GATS embraces all policies that 
might discriminate between domestic and foreign providers. Further-
more, discrimination under the GATT would only happen in one mode 
of delivery while under the GATS it would happen for all modes of 
deliveries. In terms of treatment no less favourable, it is possible for the 
GATS to circumvent a ban on intentionally discriminatory measures. In 
contrast, it is not recognised under the GATT. 
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